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We discuss an experiment employing participatory technology assessment, a 
public deliberation method for eliciting lay citizen input prior to making decisions 
about science and technology, to inform upstream engineering decisions 
concerning technical aspects of NASA’s Asteroid Initiative. In partnership with 
NASA, the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology network 
conducted a pTA-based forum on NASA’s Asteroid Initiative in late 2014. The 
goal of the exercise was to assess citizens’ values and preferences about potential 
asteroid detection, asteroid mitigation, and exploration-based technologies 
associated with NASA’s Initiative. This paper discusses the portion of the forum 
that focused on the Asteroid Redirect Mission, an effort to redirect an asteroid 
into lunar orbit that astronauts can study. The forum sought public input on two 
options for performing the mission that NASA included in technical assessments 
to make a down select decision: Option A (capturing a 10 meter diameter 
asteroid) or Option B (redirecting a several meter diameter boulder from the 
surface of a larger asteroid). We describe the values and perceptions participants 
had about Option A and B, how these results were used by NASA managers, and 
the impact the results of the participatory technology assessment had on the down 
select.
Over the past two decades, a normative goal that many scholars of public engagement with 
science and technology invoke is a two-way dialogue between the broader public and science 
and engineering practices. One proposed way of achieving this is to incorporate participatory 
technology assessment (pTA) into the decision-making processes of institutions that have the 
power to influence the direction of scientific research and technological innovation15. However, 
one of the major critiques of deliberative exercises like  pTA is that they rarely have impactful 
connections to decision-making processes16, especially in the United States17. In order to fill this 
void, Stilgoe and colleague’s model of responsible innovation necessitates going “beyond 
previous deliberative experiments so that governance institutions and structures become part of 
the experimental apparatus” (p. 1577)18. We describe herein such an experiment. 
This article features an experimental public deliberation designed to inform upstream 
engineering of an asteroid redirection system being developed for NASA’s Asteroid Initiative. 
To carry out the experiment, NASA partnered with Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science 
and Technology (ECAST), a network of universities, science museums, and non-profits invested 
in bringing the voice of the lay public into technical decision-making processes.19 This effort 
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afforded ECAST with a unique opportunity to experiment using pTA to develop linkages 
between deliberative public input and a concrete decision concerning a technical choice between 
two alternative asteroid redirection methods. What became known as the “Informing NASA’s 
Asteroid Initiative: A Citizen’s Forum” took place in November 2014 and represents a major 
step toward synching up pTA-style inputs into a U.S. government agency decision making 
apparatus.
While one of the goals of the NASA project was to provide lay citizens an opportunity to 
influence technical decision-making, this pTA experiment has also positioned us to contribute to 
the recent turn in public engagement scholarship that attempts to broaden the analysis of 
deliberative exercises to the institutional contexts in which they are implemented. Much research 
and commentary to date on pTA has focused on the potential for pTA to empower citizens and 
produce democratically legitimate outcomes20. This experiment provides the opportunity to better 
understand the institutional barriers and facilitators that contribute to pTA having a meaningful 
impact on the governance of emerging science and technology21. Our analysis represents a 
reflexive exercise where we explore the use of pTA to inform NASA’s Asteroid Initiative and 
the lessons learned by the organizers (ECAST) and NASA personnel working closely together to 
implement the project. The authors of this paper, both members of ECAST and NASA 
employees, all played a role in developing and implementing “Informing NASA’s Asteroid 
Initiative.”
As a contribution to Chilver’s observation that there is a dearth of “reflexive [institutional] 
learning relating to public dialogue on science-related issues,”22 we aim to draw on our practical 
experience with the pTA design, implementation, and results dissemination to achieve four 
goals. First, we explicate a model that demonstrates how pTA is an iterative, co-learning input 
that can inform policy and technical decisions. Second, we describe the collaboration between 
NASA and ECAST to design the pTA. Third, we examine some of the results of “Informing 
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative” and show what lay citizens can contribute to a highly complex 
technical choice between alternative technologies. Lastly, we describe how NASA engineers and 
managers used citizen input, which resulted in a generative dialogue between NASA personnel 
and ECAST during the development of the final report. We demonstrate how the results not only 
were used to support a decision, but also served as a reflection point for engineers and decision 
makers on their own values. Also, we provide a reflexive analysis of this experiment and 
consider how future engagements with federal agencies can be improved.
Participatory Technology Assessment and Engineering Systems Decision Making
While NASA is an agency that serves the public, the direct impacts of its missions are not always 
readily obvious from a casual examination. Much of its research is geared toward exploration 
and fundamental contributions to scientific knowledge. Since the end of the Cold War and 
especially after the end of the Space Shuttle program, NASA has continued to evolve its mission 
and how it describes its value.23  Nevertheless, NASA engages in many domains of research that 
have direct benefits to society, such as monitoring the Earth’s atmosphere for weather and 
climate change patterns and advancing capabilities for aircraft. Furthermore, NASA as an 
institution has some level of self-awareness of its need to justify its missions to the broader 
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public. For instance, in a period of uncertain public support in the 1970s, NASA took a 
democratic tack with the Space Shuttle program as part of how it engaged the public.24 This was 
an attempt at a more participatory exploration approach, where limited numbers of the public had 
an opportunity to be involved directly with NASA missions, mainly through sponsored research 
projects during shuttle missions. While this experiment was short-lived due to the Challenger 
disaster in 1986, NASA would later experiment more extensively with participatory democracy 
in the 21st century, through citizen science initiatives such as the Grand Challenges, maker fairs, 
and more recently with deliberative exercises like the pTA.25
These latter efforts are in response to NASA managers and engineers trying to develop systems 
and perform missions that will have significant value for the public. However, it is difficult to 
understand, especially through opinion polls, what members of broader society value on a deeper 
level, and it is even more difficult to consider public values prior to developing a mission. This is 
the context in which the pTA reported in this article came into existence. In 2013, NASA 
initiated citizen deliberations focused on what it called its Asteroid Initiative, which was defined 
as having two central components. The first is the Asteroid Grand Challenge (AGC), a planetary 
defense effort that seeks to detect all asteroid threats to human populations and determine 
appropriate mitigation actions. The second component, and the aspect most relevant to future 
human space exploration, is the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM). ARM will redirect an 
asteroid sample into vicinity of the moon, at which point astronauts will rendezvous with the 
asteroid to study it. At this early stage, NASA was debating between two mission concepts for 
ARM, one which would use an unmanned spacecraft to either redirect an entire asteroid or a 
second option which would redirect a small boulder from a larger asteroid and put it into a stable 
orbit around the moon.26
Decisions concerning which technologies to develop for ARM are highly technical and are not 
typical fodder for public debate. However, NASA managers and engineers became interested in 
learning what the public might value about different asteroid redirection options. This interest 
became a unique opportunity to experiment with linking pTA to engineers and managers 
involved in a technical decision-making process. Historically, many scholars have demonstrated 
that there is a tendency for technical experts, policy makers and stakeholders to avoid exposing 
the public to the complexity and uncertainty of scientific research and technological development 
because of prevailing perceptions that doing so slows down development of emerging science 
and technology (S&T).27 However, this approach makes policy making and S&T development 
less transparent, thus more vulnerable to public distrust and ideological stakeholder 
entrenchment.
As an antidote to this problem, many advocates of pTA suggest that the complexity of emerging 
S&T issues should be opened up to discussion, emphasizing that increased transparency and a 
pluralistic dialogue can alleviate political pressures that often emerge in “winner takes all” policy 
debates.28 This approach, it is proposed, can lead to the generation of alternative ways of thinking 
about complex technological systems and the social uncertainties associated with them, 
especially if engagement is conducted upstream to identify multiple potential pathways for 
technological development and their associated benefits and unintended physical and non-
physical harms..29 In this article we aim to show the ways lay citizens, through a pTA exercise, 
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can open up discussions and expand the horizon of considerations for technical decision makers 
when developing new technical systems.
The pTA is a public deliberation method for assessing the societal benefit of research and 
empowering the public to consider decisions that some might otherwise think a lay public would 
be incapable of doing.30 Citizen empowerment occurs in four basic ways: (1) generating policy 
input in the form of value maps (e.g., what values drive what people think about NASA missions 
and potential decisions); (2) building individual capacity to make informed decisions about 
complex technical subjects; (3) creating a sense of public ownership of decision making 
processes; and (4) developing a source of unique external technical input through a form of 
crowdsourcing. In short, it provides an informed and empowering environment for previously 
unengaged citizens to take ownership of complex technical subjects, build capacity to engage in 
complex subjects, and offer new views and consider the potential benefits, trade-offs, and long-
term consequences of proposed policies or research directions.31
The path toward the “Informing NASA’s Asteroid Initiative” pTA began with a public Request 
for Information that NASA issued in 2013 to gather industry, academic and community interest 
in the Asteroid Initiative. The request for information sought ideas in eight domains related to the 
initiative, including one on partnerships and participatory engagement. ECAST’s response 
discussed how pTA could inform NASA about public perceptions of its Asteroid Initiative and 
what citizens value about space exploration. This response resonated with the agency as a 
promising means to gauge public views of this Initiative. In April 2014, NASA awarded ECAST 
a cooperative agreement to conduct public deliberations and identify citizen perspectives about 
the Asteroid Initiative.
ECAST’s implementation of pTA incorporates a transdisciplinary research design model,32 and 
acts as a complement to techno-scientific discourse and sociopolitical discourse. The objective is 
to create an additional non-partisan public input to better inform scientific research, 
technological development and public policy. Therefore, it is a model that outlines the potential 
of linking public engagement with engineering systems design and decision-making processes. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, it has three steps: (1) Problem Framing; 2) Peer to Peer Discourse; and 
(3) Application and Reintegration. The problem framing and reintegration steps are co-
developed/co-produced by ECAST and the decision-makers involved in systems design, keeping 
the peer-to-peer discourse (step 2) informed but sufficiently shielded from unbalanced and undue 
influence of technical and policy advocacy. In other words, the process is designed to highlight 
input from citizens that do not already have a vested interest in the decision in question. As a 
result, the theoretical outcome of the deliberation provides public views and insights that could 
be different from stakeholders with vested interests.33 This is a different kind of input that 
technical decision makers at government agencies do not generally have access to or seek out.34
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Figure 1. Transdisciplinary Research Design Model.
Notes: Early stages of policy development (left column) and research design (right column) feed into ECAST pTA 
process (middle column), which produces upstream public values, knowledge, and concern outcomes that can be 
incorporated into a feedback loop into policy and research development. Adapted.35 
The first step in the “Informing NASA Asteroid Initiative” project was to plan and design public 
forums that engage citizens and solicit their informed views on issues of importance to NASA, 
which NASA could then use in its policy and engineering decision-making processes. The 
ECAST organizers and NASA program managers worked closely together to develop 
appropriate themes and content for the forums—a challenging task, since this project represented 
the first deliberative public engagement on this scale undertaken in partnership with NASA (Step 
1, Figure 1). The planning process of partner consultation, content development, facilitator 
training, and participant recruitment took place from April to October of 2014; the one-day, in-
person forums were held in November 2014.
ECAST designed the forums to explore what a diverse group of lay citizens thought about 
complex socio-technical issues when provided with information developed by a panel of experts 
on the subject matter (Step 2, Figure 1). Quite different from what a public opinion survey can 
produce,36 the NASA pTA explored the value of different cultural perspectives, rationales, 
conceptualizations, and perceptions of risk that citizens use in assessing socio-technical issues as 
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an experimental input into an engineering decision-making process. NASA expressed interest in 
learning about the perspectives and experiences that everyday people bring to considerations of 
the space agency’s decisions. Thus, in addition to capturing quantitative data that could be 
aggregated and statistically analyzed, which is a typical strategy for NASA public affairs 
consultants, this project sought qualitative data to identify the various priorities and social norms 
underlying citizens’ technical and policy preferences. ECAST then reported this data to NASA 
managers for further reflection. Consultations between ECAST and NASA proceeded through 
several iterations as NASA managers sought to understand and internalize the value of the results 
for their decision making (Step 3, Figure 1).
Deliberation Design of “Informing NASA’s Asteroid Initiative” Project
ECAST came to the partnership with experience in social science techniques for structuring 
dialogue among citizens, including exercises that help participants debate specific, pre-selected 
issues,37 ECAST organized two forums in Phoenix, Arizona and Boston, Massachusetts in 
November 2014, also leading the recruitment process and ensuring that demographics were 
roughly comparable to local populations. One hundred eighty-three citizens (97 in Phoenix and 
86 in Boston) attended the two forums. At the request of NASA, ECAST worked to minimize 
self-selection biases on the part of space advocates among the participant pool. Drawing upon 
NASA’s input, ECAST also developed informational content for citizens. Those attending the 
one-day forum were provided with read-ahead materials and spent the day learning about 
NASA’s asteroid initiative. Structured discussions were enabled by a facilitator, with NASA 
personnel present in primarily an observational role. NASA personnel remained anonymous 
except for a single opening comment at each forum that expressed NASA’s interest in knowing 
participant thoughts about the Asteroid Initiative and their plan to use the information in the 
Asteroid Redirect Mission down-select decision (meaning choice in NASA parlance). Several 
NASA personnel served on an anonymous question and answer (Q&A) panel that answered 
participant-generated clarifying questions on highly technical matters (e.g., the significance of 
asteroid de-spinning to different types of proposed asteroid redirection technologies) through an 
on-line interface where the questions and responses could be viewed by all participants.
In consultation with NASA, ECAST developed topics of discussion for participants. The overall 
forum covered four thematic areas that also included an informational planetarium show, several 
breaks, lunch, and the administration of a post-deliberation survey. The overall guiding questions 
for each theme were as follows:
1. Asteroid detection. Are citizens satisfied with existing asteroid detection approaches? 
What entity do they see as being best capable of leading detection efforts? This tied to 
the Asteroid Grand Challenge, which aims to identify all asteroid threats and to know 
how to mitigate them.
2. Planetary defense. After explaining four asteroid mitigation approaches, ECAST put 
forward a series of scenarios where asteroids have various percentage likelihoods of 
hitting the Earth. What levels of risk do people find unacceptable? How prepared do 
they want planetary defense capabilities in case of an imminent threat?
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3. Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM) down-select. In 2014, NASA spent significant 
effort internally deliberating over two competing mission proposals for ARM. Option 
A included grabbing a 10 meter (m) diameter asteroid and redirecting it to lunar orbit, 
and Option B involved grabbing a 3 m boulder off of a much larger asteroid.
4. Mars exploration. The ARM mission is part of broader plans to eventually explore 
Mars. What sorts of timeframes do citizens want exploration to occur in, and to what 
extent are they willing to trade schedule and cost for risk? To what extent do they 
want a full plan to go to Mars laid out now?
In this article, we focus on the results of the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM) session and its 
impact on technical decision-making at NASA.38 The next section provides a brief history of 
ARM and an overview of the background information participants received to prepare for 
deliberation on this topic.
Context on Asteroid Redirect Mission
As ECAST began work on developing the citizen forum in summer 2014, NASA announced that 
it would down-select between two technological options, known as Option A and Option B, in 
late 2014 or early 2015 to accomplish the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM). At NASA’s 
request, ECAST decided to focus part of the citizen forum on the ARM down-select, which was 
a decision between these two options.
The Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM) was announced in April 2013 as part of President 
Obama’s Asteroid Initiative, which was a way to implement his 2010 goal for astronauts to visit 
an asteroid by 2025. The several year mission as originally proposed, which would eventually 
become known as Option A, involved sending a vehicle, the Asteroid Robotic Redirection 
Vehicle (ARRV), to dock with a small (10 m diameter) asteroid, to envelop the asteroid in a bag, 
and then use a constant propulsive force to control the trajectory of the asteroid and slowly put it 
in the Moon’s orbit. The asteroid would be inserted into a distant retrograde orbit (DRO) where 
it is estimated it would remain about a hundred years. Once there, the crewed portion of ARM 
would occur. Astronauts on an Orion spacecraft would be launched from a Space Launch System 
rocket and would rendezvous with the ARRV and the captured asteroid. Once docked, the 
astronauts would unfold the bag, collect samples and conduct other research on the asteroid.39
NASA’s plans for this mission continued to evolve after it was first announced.40 NASA 
scientists and engineers knew from the beginning that identifying target asteroids that would 
match the right orbital trajectory required for redirection might be difficult. Complicating 
matters, it could be hard to accurately predict the material characteristics of the asteroid prior to 
the ARRV arriving at the asteroid. The characteristics of the asteroid can influence what 
scientific questions may be studied with the sample, which meant that uncertain composition 
could make prediction of scientific value difficult. This led NASA to focus on a second option 
for accomplishing the robotic segment of ARM. 
The desire for greater certainty on the structure of the target asteroid, as well as desire for more 
candidate options, led to Option B being developed.41 This option involved traveling to a larger 
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asteroid, greater than 100 m in diameter, where the probe would descend and land just above a 
boulder. The probe would use a set of robotic arms to grab the boulder, secure it, and remove the 
boulder using propulsion. The probe would then move the boulder to DRO around the Moon, 
where astronauts could dock with it.
The aim of the ARM mission down-select was to choose between Options A (inflatable bag) and 
B (robotic grabber). The following summarizes the background information given to participants 
at the forum. At a top level, both options would develop solar electric propulsion (SEP), which 
was the primary goal for the mission. SEP is a critical tool needed for human spaceflight 
missions, as it would make possible sending large volumes of payload to Mars with significantly 
less propellant, thus lowering the number of costly launches needed for exploration. Options A 
and B were equally beneficial in this respect. Option A would ostensibly retrieve the larger 
sample, but because of the technique’s inability to accurately gauge the physical composition of 
the asteroid prior to capture, the mission potentially could retrieve a sample less than half the 
size of the targeted 10 m diameter, leaving its scientific value uncertain. In comparison, Option B 
would involve challenges with removing the boulder from the surface of the asteroid.
Despite these trade-offs, both would provide benefits for helping with planetary defense, but in 
ways specifically related to each method’s technological capabilities. Option A could utilize an 
ion beam deflector and a so-called gravity tractor maneuver.42 Option B could use the additional 
mass of the boulder to do what is known as an enhanced gravity tractor, where its influence 
would be significantly enhanced by the mass of the boulder. In the background information, 
Option B was described as more beneficial for planetary defense for that reason. Option B was 
also envisioned as having a use for developing a mission to Mars, as it could be used to retrieve 
samples from the moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos. Option A has been discussed as having 
potential dual-uses for orbital debris removal from Earth orbit. Initial NASA estimates showed 
that the cost of both options would essentially be the same, with both costing less than $1.25 
billion, meaning that cost was not a deciding factor between the two options.
The uncertainties involved with the two options varied in nature. Some uncertainties, as 
discussed above, are technical in nature. But other uncertainties, such as how to value the larger 
size of the Option A asteroid, the potential use to Mars missions, the potential dual-use for space 
debris removal, and the potential benefits for planetary defense, are all influenced by social 
values. As such, the ARM down-select had uncertain dimensions that could be affected by what 
values and preferences the public and decision makers hold. This background information about 
the trade-offs of each option, both technical and social, were presented to the pTA participants to 
consider. As the pTA effort developed, NASA continued its progress on the ARM. In December 
2014, right before NASA planned its down-select, ECAST gave NASA an interim report on the 
ARM portion of the deliberation, which was reviewed as background information for NASA’s 
consideration prior to its decision about ARM Option A and Option B.43
Deliberation Procedure
This session solicited both group and individual preferences for ARM Options A or B. The ARM 
session ran for 60 minutes, which began with a video that reiterated the background information 
given to participants prior to the forum. After the video, participants were given fifteen minutes 
to deliberate and share their reactions to the video. Facilitators at each table specifically asked 
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participants to discuss the trade-offs between Options A and B, guiding the conversation to 
comparison points, such as potential scientific benefits and relevance to future exploration. After 
discussing the options, the participant had an additional 10 minutes to develop a written group 
recommendation for one of the two mission profiles and provide a rationale behind their choice. 
In addition to the group recommendation, facilitators asked participants to vote individually and 
provide personal rationales for their preference. Table 1 below provides a summary of participant 
derived benefits and considerations for the options. 
Table 1. Summary of Benefits and Considerations on ARM options.
Option A Option B
Mission Profile: Capture of an entire ~ 10 meter 
asteroid with inflatable bag system. 
Mission Profile: Retrieval of a smaller (1-3 meter) 
boulder from the surface of a much larger (~ 100 
meter) asteroid using a robotic “grabber.”
Benefits
 This technology could potentially be applied 
to the problem of clearing away space junk 
from low Earth orbit.
 A larger asteroid would yield more samples 
and eventually be more valuable.
Benefits
 The larger parent asteroid could be 
compositionally characterized before target 
selection, allowing a greater control over the 
properties of the retrieved object.
 Operations on the surface of the larger object 
are likely to be relevant to future human 
exploration than capturing a smaller object.
Considerations
 Is the risk that the target turns out to be a 
rubble pile rather than a monolithic object 
acceptable?
 This option will require de-spinning the object 
before capture – an important capability to 
demonstrate for deep-space operations. Is this 
a compelling engineering challenge?
 Does the smaller choice of targets make this 
option less interesting?
Considerations
 This option will allow a gravity tractor 
demonstration on a much larger object than 
option A, which could help advance planetary 
defense against an asteroid threatening the 
Earth. Is this a compelling engineering 
challenge?
 Is this option “cool” enough?
 Will the ability to select from many different 
boulders lower risk and improve the mission?
The group and individual voting results from this session favored Option B (robotic “grabber”). 
At both sites combined, 21 deliberation groups out of 27 voted for Option B (4 voted for A and 2 
voted for neither).  The individual voting followed a similar pattern to the group voting, with 
participants choosing Option B (76 percent) over Option A (24 percent) by a significant margin.44 
While the voting results eventually aligned with NASA’s decision in March 2015 to go with 
Option B, this is not the important result of the experiment. What ultimately was important was 
how NASA engineers and managers interacted with the participant rationales, 
conceptualizations, and expressed values for their choices. The next section explores what 
further can be gained by understanding how lay citizens introduce more socio-technical 
complexity into decision-making, provide diverse value maps; and develop rationales for their 
choices.
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Results: Lay Citizen Contributions to Technical Decision-Making Processes
We used a multi-valent data collection approach, which relied on table observations, 
participants’ written rationales, and quantitative votes. For table observations, we observed the 
full day of discussion at 8 of the 27 tables convened at the two sites. The individual rationales 
reveal nuanced information about participant values and opinions. In the discussion, we take a 
closer look at the qualitative table observations and written rationales to ascertain a deeper 
understanding of the participant values that drove the group and individual voting results. What 
is unique about this subset of the pTA deliberation is that it mainly focused on the trade-offs of a 
technical decision that has no inherent controversial elements associated with them. 
Introducing Socio-technical Complexity to Technical Decision Making
Because of the technical nature of the decision, it made the deliberation of this topic an area ripe 
for participants to open-up new avenues of deliberation for techno-scientific decision-makers. 
While engineers and other techno-scientific decision-makers are generally leery of violating the 
technical/social value dichotomy, lay citizens are not as bound to such norms, thus can add to the 
socio-technical complexity of a decision.45 To assess the degree to which participants used social 
versus technical language in their deliberations, we analysed 183 written participant statements 
concerning their rationale for choosing Option A or Option B. Statements that were dominated 
by explicit expression of social values were coded as primarily social (e.g., assertion of goals, 
derived benefits, potential, and societal concerns), whereas statements dominated by explicit 
technical language were coded primarily as technical (e.g., technical aspects such as gravity 
tractor, asteroid sample, data, and testing technology). We acknowledge that all techno-scientific 
statements have both technical and social elements. However, technical language embodies a 
higher level of abstraction that is more detached from specific, value-laden goals, obscuring the 
socio-political elements of technological development. By identifying the use of abstract 
technical language, one can discern individual tendencies toward separation of technical and 
social values, where people either consciously or subconsciously obscure social values through 
technical language.46
We found that roughly 70 percent of participant statements were dominated by social language, 
which, perhaps unsurprisingly, means that deliberations drifted more toward the social merits 
and concerns of the alternatives than the technical value and concerns. This also means that 
participants did not necessarily adopt the technical language of NASA engineers and managers 
to inform their choices. This is important to note because it represents on a general level how 
participants sought to increase the socio-technical complexity of the decision-making process, 
thereby increasing the diversity of values technical decision makers are exposed to.
Public Value Mapping
What sorts of reasons did participants use to justify their decisions? To garner a greater 
understanding of the diversity of ways participants viewed and conceptualized each option, we 
examined the same 183 statements responding to the prompt: “What were your primary reasons 
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for your recommendation [of Option A or Option B]?” All words in each statement were 
examined to determine the primary rationales by which participants characterized their 
preference for Option A or B. Words were organized into categories based on similarity of 
meaning and use. For example, a common concept used by participants to describe why they 
chose one option over the other was “control.” But the idea of control could be described in 
several different terms, including words like manipulate, maneuver, capture, grab, grasp, 
redirect, “lasso,” retrieve, handle, and manage. Individual statements that contained at least one 
of these words used in the proper context counted as “control.”47 Also, a statement could be 
coded into more than one category if it contained more than one concept. For instance, the 
following statement, “Best helps with long-term goals of going to Mars and testing new 
technology,” falls into 6 categories: help (“helps”), goal (“goal”), Mars (“Mars”), science 
(“testing”), exciting (“new”), and technology (“technology”). 
Table 2 shows the distribution of concepts used by participants to justify their choices. 
Participants used a wide variety of concepts to justify their choices, which would typically be 
obscured by voting results or an opinion poll that NASA personnel use to gauge the public. 
Through this upstream analysis, NASA engineers and managers can think through the diverse 
ways that people come to understand and value emerging technology. While the leading rationale 
for choosing A versus B was scientific advancement (Science = 38.8 percent), one cannot 
consider this as a sole justification. Overall, no one justification dominates the participant 
dialogue. One has to consider a wide range of reasons because most justifications were 
multivalent. Many of the justifications expressed social values on an abstract level, such as the 
future potential (18.5 percent) of an option or its flexibility (12 percent) to play different roles. 
This suggests that for some that the asteroid redirection technology must have benefits that go 
beyond its primary mission. Other justifications hone in on a specific expression of values, such 
as planetary defense (12.6 percent) or going to Mars (16.4 percent).  More specifically, certain 
concepts and rationales resonated with participants when picking Option A or B.
Table 2. Distribution of Concepts and Rationales Between Options A and B.
Rationale Option A Option B Combined
(n=183 statements)
Science 9 62 71 (38.8%)
Technology 7 32 41* (22.4%)
Sample 13 24 38* (20.8%)
Potential 6 28 34  (18.5%)
Success 8 25 33  (18.0%)
Control 7 24 31  (16.9%)
Mars 1 28 30*  (16.4%)
Failure 4 3 7  (3.8%)
Gravity Tractor 0 29 29 (15.9%)
Exploration 1 24 28* (15.3%)
Planetary Defense 0 23 23 (12.6%)
Flexible 2 20 22 (12.0%)
Future 5 17 22 (12.0%)
Composition 7 13 22* (12.0%)
Landing 0 19 20* (10.9%)
Exciting 8 12 20 (10.9%)
Economic 7 11 18 (9.8%)
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Proving Ground 2 12 17* (9.3%)
Data 1 14 15 (8.2%)
Help 0 12 13* (7.1%)
Space Junk 11 1 12 (6.6%)
Benefit 4 8 12 (6.6%)
Safety 3 8 11 (6.0%)
Mining 2 7 10* (5.5%)
Advance 1 8 9 (4.9%)
Practice 1 8 9 (4.9%)
Human 1 8 9 (4.9%)
Proven Technology 0 7 7 (3.8%)
Engineering 2 4 7* (3.8%)
Time 2 4 6 (3.3%)
Private 3 1 6* (3.3%)
Relevance 0 6 6 (3.3%)
Uncertain 0 4 5* (2.7%)
Ion 1 4 5 (2.7%)
Notes; All percentages are based on n=183 statements (Phoenix and Boston combined). Only coded concepts with 5 
or more utterances are included in this table. When the Option A and Option B columns do not add up to the 
combined total in the last column, this means the remainder were rationales that did not support A or B.
Participants’ reasons for choosing A or B varied considerably. Some of the more common 
reasons related to their interest in Option B were planetary defense (23 mentions) and gravity 
tractor technology (29 mentions), the latter of which is generally linked to improving planetary 
defense. Also, many people related the choice for Option B in terms of going to Mars, as Option 
B could be extended to Mars moon missions (28 mentions). People who chose Option A gave 
reasons related to collecting space junk (11 mentions) and collecting asteroid samples (13 
mentions). In essence, individuals’ reasons for choosing between Option A and Option B were 
varied and quite particular. People may have been biased by their own particular concerns. For 
instance, those who chose Option B also perceived this technology as being more in line with 
planetary defense, which was dealt with extensively earlier in the day; thus during the day, it 
might have become a more immediate concern. Others may have been looking at this through 
their desire to see economic gains come out of these ventures (e.g., mining), while others were 
driven by aspirations to explore (e.g., going to Mars), or concerns about the increasing amounts 
of space junk in Earth’s orbit.
In summary, we did this analysis to point out the diverse ways that lay citizens can think about a 
highly technical decision. The main take away from this analysis is that it provides technical 
decision-makers much to think about in terms of aligning goals of NASA missions with public 
desires. For instance, NASA managers and engineers were “surprised” to see to what extent the 
participants desired that the priorities of ARM should align with planetary defense. Table 3 
shows that planetary defense was just as important to participants as scientific advancement and 
exploration. Beyond being able to reflect on the diversity of values that people invoke when 
thinking about deep space exploration, decision-makers became very interested in how 
participant rationales are formed. This allowed them to understand that people possess the ability 
to think through complexity in a variety of ways.
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Table 3. Average Priority Rankings of Potential Goals of the Asteroid Redirect Mission.
GOAL MA AZ COMBINED P<0.05
ADVANCING SCIENCE 2.76 
(1.40)
2.51 (1.78) 2.63 
(1.62)
A
ADVANCING PLANETARY DEFENSE 2.54 
(1.81)
2.85 (1.63) 2.71 
(1.72)
A
ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY NEEDED 
FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
2.65 
(1.40)
2.87 (1.78) 2.77 
(1.62)
A
REDIRECTING AN ASTEROID THAT 
NO ONE HAS BEEN TO BEFORE
4.01 
(1.82)
4.71 (1.73) 4.38 
(1.81)
B
DEVELOPING THE ECONOMIC 
POTENTIAL OF ASTEROIDS
4.67 
(1.45)
4.36 (1.85) 4.51 
(1.69)
B, C
ENGAGING WITH COMMERCIAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
5.00 
(1.54)
4.86 (1.56) 4.93 
(1.55)
C
PERFORMING AN EXCITING MISSION 6.05 
(1.26)
5.68 (1.71) 5.86 
(1.52)
D
Notes: Numbers in table are on a scale of 1 – 7 (1 = highest priority; 7= lowest priority). The goals are 
arranged in ascending order from highest to lowest priority based on voting in Massachusetts (MA) and 
Arizona (AZ) combined. The voting in Massachusetts and Arizona are consistent. The letters in last column 
refer to the “Combined” category. Categories that do not share a letter are statistically significantly 
different at p<0.05.
Understanding Lay Citizen Rationales
Participant rationale formation is also an important dimension of a deliberation for engineers and 
managers to consider. The citizen conceptualizations and rationales outlined in Table 2 only 
offer preliminary insights on how people are thinking about the two options.  Analysis of the 
table observation data and written rationales demonstrate that participants successfully navigated 
and effectively incorporated scientific and technical details into their discussions and 
considerations for ARM A or B.
One way to judge the utility of the deliberation in providing space for the development and 
expression of informed views by members of the public is to directly observe the conversations 
among participants.48 If one observes at a table discussion over the course of a day that 
participants drift among topics or simply cannot understand important technical issues 
sufficiently for forming an opinion about them, the utility of the deliberation clearly is called into 
question. On the other hand, if the participants engage with the complexity of the issues and 
provide a clear rationale for their views, they have attained a level of informed and considered 
insight that can be useful to decision makers.  To determine the efficacy of the table discussions, 
we used table observation data to shed light on two questions: what was the quality of the 
deliberation; and what reasoning did the participants use in developing and expressing their 
views on the questions put to them in the course of the day?
An analysis of the data from four table groups provides considerable evidence that the quality of 
the discussions was high in many fundamental regards. Furthermore, this analysis provides some 
insight into the common features of participant discussions and the variety of rationales adopted 
to support Option A or B. Of the four tables analyzed here, one group supported Option A (see 
Box 1 below), two groups supported Option B, and one group was split over A or B. This 
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analysis revealed some challenges and unevenness in conversation, though the deliberations 
reflected strong and thoughtful communication among citizens.
At all of the tables reviewed here, all or most of the participants contributed their thoughts; most 
or all of the issues and arguments raised in the background materials and videos were considered 
by the participants; and participants often used the anonymous expert Q&A resource to clarify 
technical questions and misconceptions. While some participants spoke more than others, there 
were no instances in which one or two dominated the discussion (even at one table that included 
a master’s and a Ph.D. student in astrophysics); there were few uncorrected errors or 
misconceptions in the discussions; when confusion  about technical issues emerged (e.g., the 
importance of de-spinning an asteroid for A and  B), participants often asked clarifying questions 
from the expert panel via an on-line interface; and the reasons that participants provided 
individually and as groups for their votes were consistent with those addressed in discussions. In 
addition, the table observations showed that many participants considered and in some cases 
advocated reasons in support of their views on Option A or Option B that were not reported with 
the votes. Nonetheless, there was variation in the extent to which participants identified issues 
not addressed in the background material, in how directly they engaged one another’s arguments, 
and how well they understood the material. 
As for tracing citizen rationales, the ECAST team asked the following questions that NASA 
decision-makers wanted to know as they considered the results: Is it possible to trace why 
citizens provided the answers they did? Is it possible to see if their input is based on solid and 
adequate reasoning? In Table 4, the written notes from an ECAST table observer from an 
Arizona table that voted for Option A were highlighted for NASA managers and engineers to 
illustrate how citizens developed rationales and worked through misconceptions. It is clear that 
the participants carefully examined and read through the background information. The vignette 
helps establish that the group made a technically credible decision. Further, the individual 
written rationales on A, shown in Table 5, listed the potential for larger samples of asteroids to 
study and the removal of space debris as a potential side benefit. This illustrates that in 
combination with table observations, individual rationales provide more clarity on why an option 
was chosen. It is important to understand here that while this group did not vote in the direction 
that most groups voted, they did have a consistent logic for the choice they made that NASA 
personnel could use to reflect on their own decisions.
Table 4. Table Observer Notes on Option A.
At one of the four tables in Arizona that voted for Option A, several participants expressed their preference for 
“the bag” very early in the conversation. A great deal of attention was given to sorting through technical 
questions, most of which the participants resolved by consulting the background material and table cards. This 
group questioned the material that had been provided to them and they also questioned one another. Given the 
concerns in the video that the material to be retrieved via Option A might turn out to be a rubble pile, the group 
asked the NASA experts if this affected the value of the material. The response was that “There is nothing 
wrong with capturing a rubble pile. The astronauts would still be able to approach the captured rubble pile, so 
the crewed mission could still work either way. The composition of the asteroid could be more or less 
interesting for science.” This reinforced the participants’ views that there were few downsides to Option A. As 
one participant noted upon receiving the expert response, “Well if they don’t know the value of it then it’s not 
a risk.” The conversation then turned to the nature of the risk described in the background material, with one 
participant noting that “it says there is a possibility the asteroid would have to be de-spinned, and engineers 
don’t know how to figure that one out,” but another immediately respond that “it said it was more of an 
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engineering challenge” and went on to argue that she took this to mean that it was a challenge that could likely 
be overcome. This attention to detail and shared problem-solving was evident throughout the discussion. While 
there were some disagreements between participants on facts and arguments, both pros and cons of Option B 
were discussed and all participants expressed their support for Option A when the facilitator polled them.
Table 4. Combined Group and Individual Written Justifications for Table 4.
Table/Participan
t
Option A Most Important Factors/Primary Motivation
4 1 Scenario A
More material, space junk, side benefits
4-1 1 Seems more probable
4-2 1 It can pick up space junk as well as asteroids. It can get bigger asteroids, too.
4-3 Cost and safety
4-4 1 Get a whole asteroid rather than a small piece of one. Practical application of also 
collecting space trash in orbit around Earth.
4-5 1 Larger sample for more research
4-6 1 Scenario A allows us to take a larger sample of the asteroids. A single boulder 
may not be indicative of the materials and properties of its host asteroid. An 
entire one lets us have a larger sample until we have a focused research goal.
4-7 1 Smaller boulder in option 2 can be from another boulder and not necessarily able 
to give us the information for the "big 1.. Also, love the idea of "cleaning" up the 
solar system.
Impact: NASA Use of Participatory Technology Assessment Data
A key contribution of the pTA was discussed in the last section: the results represent a public 
value map of what a more informed group of the public thinks about different aspects of the 
ARM mission, including perceptions about economic goals, technical risks and uncertainty. This 
is a contribution on its own, as it represents a synthesis of views that can be considered by 
decision-makers as they reflect on their own values. However, an additional contribution can 
follow from assessing how the results from this forum were used by NASA and to assess the 
results of the ultimate decision on ARM. Demonstrating a meaningful impact that resulted from 
the participant discussions can help serve as proof that the broader purposes of pTA are being 
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achieved, empowering citizens that provide public value maps to aid decision-making, build 
individual capacity to make informed decisions, create a sense of public ownership, and develop 
a source of unique external technical input through a form of crowdsourcing.
Independent assessment of the importance of the NASA ECAST pTA to internal NASA 
decision-making processes is a challenge, as pre-decisional information surrounding government 
procurement decisions cannot be shared publicly. This means that sensitive details of the criteria 
for procurement decisions and the relative salience of items that fed into them cannot be fully 
discussed. Nonetheless, there are several ways to assess the results of the decision: official 
NASA statements on the results from the citizen forum; assessing the formal role of the pTA 
results in the decision; and self-reporting from NASA officials, whom are co-authors here, as to 
the value of the results.
Given that NASA is a heterogeneous organization with different managers and personnel that 
each have different opinions, official agency statements are often the best way to assess what 
NASA’s views are. Such statements are developed by program staff and signed off on by 
multiple chains of management. In a formal press release discussing the pTA results, NASA 
claimed: “This innovative approach exposes NASA, through a third party, to new views the 
agency might otherwise not have access to – opinions from Americans interested in the future of 
NASA exploration and our journey to Mars… Study participants expressed nuanced and 
informed preferences about the options… NASA decision makers have evaluated the 
perspectives uncovered through this innovative approach and will consider the data, and this new 
approach to informed public participation in America's space program, as we continue our 
journey to Mars.”49 This reflects overall a sense of appreciation for the insights provided by the 
citizens, viewing the results as ‘nuanced and informed preferences.’ This level of recognition is a 
first for a government agency using pTA results.
Furthermore, the results of the citizen forum were used as information in part of the decision50. 
This itself is likely a first for a major government activity: senior management time is a precious 
commodity inside of an agency, and that the ARM program management team chose to share 
results more broadly in the final agency decision meeting is significant. Public engagement (or 
‘communications’) products are not typically discussed in an acquisition context, which 
highlights that this pTA was used as a decision support tool.
We can also provide insight on how NASA managers considered the pTA data during their 
decision-making process without sharing pre-decisional information. The general preference of 
the participants (Option B) did align with NASA’s eventual choice, and some of the core 
rationales and values expressed by the public helped affirm NASA managers’ sense of their own 
values as they approached the decision. We felt that the forum was a step in the right direction in 
terms of developing stronger linkages between decision makers and public engagements.
We can also give insight on how the NASA team interpreted the results and presented them to 
higher levels of management inside of NASA. NASA focused on the ARM results earlier than 
the rest of the deliberation results because they wanted to review them before making a final 
decision about Option A versus Option B. In fact, NASA asked ECAST to accelerate the forum 
dates to be able to have the data in advance of making their decisions. The preliminary results 
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from the forums included the voting results, participant views of the process through a post-
survey, and a rough qualitative analysis of participant rationales. The second author of the paper 
(Pirtle) presented the results to NASA management as discussed above, and then provided 
ECAST feedback. Discussions within NASA management ranged from whether the background 
material biased participant preferences toward Option B, whether differences in facilitator 
quality between Arizona and Massachusetts affected results, whether the overall framing of the 
forum may have biased the participant responses, and whether discussion at the event of ‘de-
spinning’ as a risk for Option A, which experts find to be surmountable, biased the answers 
between Option A and B. In response, ECAST discussed challenges with the deliberation and 
facilitation process and presented opportunities to improve on the process. ECAST worked up a 
further analysis to answer questions concerning the effects of overall forum framing on 
participant choices (did the framing bias participants towards Option B), participant ability to 
overcome misconceptions, inconsistencies in forum implementation (why did the Arizona forum 
have groups voting for Option A, but not Massachusetts), and the processes by which 
participant’s reasoned out their choices. Based on this analysis, specific threats of bias, such as 
the overall framing of the forum and possible misconceptions about de-spinning, were deemed 
not to be a major threat to reliability as they were not commonly cited in the written rationales. 
However, uncertainty remained, and NASA analysts did not perceive the final vote percentages 
for Options A and B as being definitive of what an informed public would prefer.
In the end, the iterative dialog between ECAST and NASA did generate a rough public value 
map that highlighted the socio-technical complexity that lay citizens introduce into an 
assessment of emerging technology that NASA managers could reflect on in relation to their 
decision about Option A versus B. Once questions about the legitimacy of the “Informing 
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative” forums were addressed, it did allow internal NASA briefings to be 
focused more on the diverse and at times conflicting values expressed in different participant 
rationales. During meetings, NASA managers gave more attention to qualitative results that 
showed value statements about different participant perceptions of the two choices than on 
quantitative results. The nature of the citizens’ input was diverse, including some formal 
rankings of risk, a prioritization of possible goals for the mission, as well as, some discussion of 
schedule priorities.51 Many of the written rationales incorporated the values and goals of the 
citizens, while others provided technical opinions about risk or economic value. Common 
participant rationales provided in the forums included potential uses for Mars exploration, more 
precise control of asteroids, adaptability to different types of missions, and developing improved 
planetary defense techniques (Option B), obtaining a larger asteroid sample for economic and 
research purposes, and the ability to remove orbital debris (Option A). This list of common 
rationales was a central point in NASA’s internal briefings on the forum results. Internal 
briefings said that these rationales could be useable by management to help reflect on their own 
values and goals for the mission. While managers reviewed both quantitative and qualitative 
results, the results themselves were not used to directly decide which approach to ARM should 
be pursued. However, the combination of quantitative and qualitative results helped managers 
consider statements written by a broader group, better positioning themselves to consider what 
would benefit the public at large.
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Theoretical Insights and Caveats
Separate from the practical impact, there are several aspects of the pTA results that provide 
insight on the complexity of pTA and on the nature of how results are used. The first theoretical 
comment is the amount of co-learning that happened among NASA officials and the ECAST 
personnel during the process. The presentation of results was an iterative process of several 
presentations, followed up with questions from NASA, several rounds of analysis, a couple 
preliminary reports, and then a final report.52 As a consequence, NASA and ECAST had 
significant dialogue and interaction prior to December that involved discussions about the 
reliability of the results and exploring possible biases in participant responses. This high level of 
interaction was not anticipated by either ECAST or NASA, as neither had experienced a 
partnership of this nature before. In hindsight, we realized this exercise became a co-learning 
process about how to best integrate results into NASA’s decision-making process. It took several 
rounds of discussions for each partner to understand what could be done with the results and 
accompanying data. 
Not being familiar with pTA deliberations, NASA personnel initially used this exchange as an 
opportunity to better understand how deliberations work and the extent that lay citizens can 
assimilate technical information. While on the surface this line of questioning privileges the 
deficit model of public understanding of science,53 it is a necessary step in building trust between 
the deliberation process and decision-makers. It builds the foundation on a proximal level that 
allows a deeper reflection on the rationales and values of participants, and on a more ultimate 
level that firms up linkages between public engagement and decision-making processes. 54 In 
essence, it is a step toward “opening up” conversations about the future direction of emerging 
space technologies.55  The process became an opportunity to experiment with making social 
values “useable” for decision-makers.56 This iterative dialogue/co-learning may have been 
necessary to build trust on the NASA side of the dialogue.
Projects such as the NASA pTA exercise, offer excellent opportunities to study novel public 
input mechanisms. Future pTA partnerships with government agencies should adopt a rigorous 
assessment apparatus designed to understand the nature of institutional change associated with 
pTA and how deliberation results are used in decision making. Emery et al’s57 observations about 
developing meaningful linkages between public engagement exercises and decision-makers is 
very apt in hindsight of this experiment.
What is missing is an audit of the final decision-making process – a process which often involves 
last-minute modifications and compromises that are not reported. Such an audit would shed light 
on how decisions are made, including under what circumstances evidence is or is not taken up and 
used. This offers greater potential for identifying more concrete relationships between PE 
practices and policy. (p. 441).
However, there are real limits to what pre-decisional information can be shared, especially in 
environments with multiple stakeholders. While most scholars of public engagement describe a 
successful integration of deliberation results as having post-analysis that shows the influence of a 
pTA events,58 which this partnership did not do, reflecting on the experimental relationship 
between ECAST and NASA helps us understand ways to better integrate data into decision-
making and some of the challenges of doing so.
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Conclusion
In sum, this proof of concept study informs an engineering decision using public deliberation. 
This paper reports on an interesting episode in the history of NASA and the Asteroid Redirect 
Mission: it marks the first time that a NASA mission has had a structured participatory element 
involved in making strategic and technical decisions. Simply considering feedback from a 
representative public in early mission planning is unique for NASA and is rare within the 
broader U.S. government. Furthermore, the pTA results achieved the experiment’s goal of 
soliciting myriad diverse views that NASA is not traditionally exposed to. It was of value to 
managers to consider these results and the effort suggests how engineering decisions benefit 
from having structured and deliberated public input. As future R&D managers strive to meet the 
needs of the public, being able to reflect on structured and informed public views can 
significantly help managers bring forward proposals that will best deliver what society wants.59
To inform the practice of pTA, the iterative co-learning observed in our experiment helps 
indicate the amount of effort that may be needed for future pTAs to be useful when engaging 
with government partners. New ground was explored with this pTA effort, as it may be unique in 
the level of technical depth explored by citizens, as well as, the pTA being tied to a tangible 
decision (the ARM down-select). Mapping out the values involved by the public is a useful 
avenue for proactively drawing in the public to inform future engineering decisions.
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